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INIMICUS LIBERTATIS:
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST’S MAJORITY OR PLURALITY
OPINIONS IN THE FIELD OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
With a Bibliography
By
Donald E. Wilkes, Jr.
Professor of Law, UGA School of Law
August 12, 2007
Note: This survey covers U. S. Supreme Court decisions through the end
of the Rehnquist’s last term on the U.S. Supreme Court, the October 2004 Term,
which ended on June 27, 2005. An earlier version of this paper was published
as an article in The Georgia Defender, p. 1 (April 1990).

One could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s bottom line results by looking, not at anything in the United
States Reports, but rather at the platforms of the Republican
Party.–Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 1326,
1328 (1990) (footnote omitted).
Our civilization can protect itself against open attacks on its
principles by those who deny them, but cannot long withstand desertion
by those who affirm them.–H. Ehrmann, The Case That Will Not Die x
(1969).
If we are impressed by the “genius of Jeffreys’ personality,” we
must still admit that in a judge, justice comes first; that if injustice is to
be weighed, genius cannot be put in the opposite scale–it adds weight to
the injustice.”–John C. Fox, The Lady Ivie’s Trial lxv (1929).

Impius et crudelis judicandus est qui libertati non favet. [He is to
be judged impious and cruel who does not favor liberty.]–Black’s Law
Dictionary 924 (3d ed. 1933).
Analysis
Since the early 1970’s an increasingly conservative Supreme Court of
the United States has been leading this country through a “Criminal
Procedure Counterrevolution” (also called “The Rehnquisition”),
during which the federal rights and remedies of criminal defendants
have been inexorably and significantly eroded. There are numerous
books and law review articles discussing this counterrevolution. Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the most articulate and ideological of the Courts
conservative justices, may properly be regarded as the intellectual
founder and leader of this trend in favor of restricting criminal
procedure rights.
From the time he took office as an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States on Jan. 7, 1972, William Hubbs Rehnquist
(who became Chief Justice on Sept. 26, 1986) until his death on Sept.
4, 2005, wrote 173 majority or plurality opinions for the Court in
decisions in the field of criminal procedure–that is, in cases involving
(1) a criminal defendant, i.e., a person suspected of, charged with, or
convicted of committing a crime, and (2) the construction or application of (a) a criminal statute or rule of criminal procedure or of a
habeas corpus or civil rights statute, or (b) the constitutional rights
protected by the fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, or fourteenth amendments.
In 152 of these 173 criminal procedure decisions (88%) Rehnquist’s
opinion was in favor of the government. In only 21 of these 173
decisions (12%) did Rehnquist write a majority or plurality opinion
upholding a defendant’s claim that a statute or rule of procedure had
been erroneously interpreted or that a right had been denied, and one
of these 21 opinions was overruled by another opinion of Rehnquist’s
written three years later. Five of the 21 opinions were authored before
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1976, and six of the 21 before 1980. Between Jan. 1, 1980, and his
death 25 years later, therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist handed down
only 15 pro-defendant opinions: one in 1987, one in 1990, one in 1992,
one in 1995, one in 1997, three in 1998, three in 1999, two in 2000, one
in 2004, and one in 2005. There was not a single Rehnquist prodefendant opinion in 1980 or in subsequent years through 1986. Nor
was there a single such Rehnquist opinion in 1988, 1989, 1991, 1993,
1994, 2001, 2002, or 2003.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Rehnquist has written 152 majority
or plurality criminal procedure opinions rejecting the claim of the
defendant that a statute or rule was wrongly interpreted, or that his or
her federal constitutional rights were violated. On average, therefore,
Rehnquist, during his 33 years on the Court authored nearly five (the
precise figure: 4.6) anti-defendant opinions each year he has served on
the Court, while his pro-defendant opinions average less than one per
year (the precise figure: 0.64). There were 18 of Rehnquist’s progovernment opinions in the period 1972-1975, 22 in the period 19761980, 26 in the period 1981-1985, 31 in the period 1986-1990, 25 in the
period 1991-1995, 18 in the period 1996-2000, and 12 in the period
2001-2005. From the time he joined the Supreme Court in 1972 until
his death in 2005, there was only one year, 2005, in which Rehnquist
did not author at least two pro-government opinions, and in 1984 alone
he wrote 10 such opinions.
This is a breathtaking record of serving up apologias for government
power and disfavoring the rights of individuals in criminal procedure
cases. A judge with this record, a judge who between Jan. 1, 1980 and
June 30, 2005, wrote 116 majority or plurality criminal procedure
opinions upholding the government’s position and but 15 opinions
sustaining the contentions of the criminal defendant, justly deserves,
it is submitted, the appellation inimicus libertatis–the enemy of liberty.
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Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 21 criminal procedure opinions upholding
a defendant’s contentions are listed and summarized in chronological
order in Part I, and his 152 criminal procedure opinions denying a
defendant’s claims are listed and summarized in chronological order
in Part II.
PART I
Rehnquist Opinions Not in Favor of the Government
1.
Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973) (marijuana possession conviction of black civil rights worker violated due process
because trial court refused to permit jurors on voir dire to be examined concerning possible racial prejudice; conviction reversed)
2.
Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505 (1973) (Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.
387 (1970), prohibiting on double jeopardy grounds an individual from
being subjected to two prosecutions, state and municipal, based on
same act or offense, is fully retroactive; order granting §2254 habeas
corpus relief affirmed)
3.
United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395 (1974) (statutory construction
case; defendant’s conduct involving a scheme to defraud did not fall
within the reach of the federal mail fraud statute; reversal of conviction affirmed)
4.
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974) (the motion picture
“Carnal Knowledge” is not obscene; conviction of Albany theater
manager for showing the movie is reversed)
5.
United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975) (although it is
unclear whether the trial court’s judgment discharging the defendant
was a resolution of the factual issues against the government, the
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double jeopardy clause bars government appeal from the judgment,
since further proceedings of some sort devoted to resolving factual
issues going to the elements of the offense charged would have been
required in the trial court if the judgment was reversed; order dismissing government’s appeal from judgment discharging defendant affirmed), overruled, United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.)
6.
Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) (a conviction by a
nonunanimous six person jury for a nonpetty offense violates right to
trial by jury guaranteed by sixth and fourteenth amendments; conviction reversed)
7.
Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58 (1987) (generally, a
defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any recognized defense for
which there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in
his favor; federal criminal defendants are not barred from asserting
inconsistent defenses at trial; even if a defendant on trial in federal
court denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an
entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find entrapment; conviction reversed)
8.
Florida v. Wells, 495 U. S. 1 (1990) (inventory search of locked
suitcase found in impounded automobile violated fourth amendment
because highway patrol had no policy whatever with respect to the
opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory search;
pretrial order suppressing evidence affirmed)
9.
Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U. S. 159 (1992) (admission, at sentencing phase of capital punishment trial, of evidence that defendant
was member of white racist prison gang, was violative of first and
fourteenth amendment rights of defendant; death sentence vacated)
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10. United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995) (Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990, which prohibits possession of firearms in school
zones, exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause of the
U. S. Constitution and is unconstitutional (!); decision of the court of
appeals reversing defendant’s conviction is affirmed)
11. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U. S. 690 (1996) (de novo standard
is appropriate standard of appellate review of district court decision
involving the issues of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause
to search; court of appeals erred in applying a deferential standard
under which the district court decision would be reversed only for
clear error; judgment of court of appeals affirming denial of motion to
suppress is reversed)
12. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U. S. 899 (1997) (§2254 federal habeas
corpus proceeding by state prisoner; the petitioner was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death in an Illinois state court; later the trial
judge was convicted of taking bribes from criminal defendants;
although the trial judge was not bribed in the petitioner’s case, the
judge was “fixing” other cases around the time of the petitioner’s trial,
and the petitioner contends that the judge had an interest in convicting
him in order to deflect suspicion that he was taking bribes in other
cases; here, the petitioner has made a sufficient factual showing to
establish good cause for discovery within the meaning of Rule 6(a),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases; decision of court of appeals
affirming denial of relief is reversed)
13. Bousley v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1998) (§ 2255 proceeding;
where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by failing to
raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the
defendant can first demonstrate either cause and prejudice or that he
is actually innocent; we have held that a claim that is so novel that its
legal basis is not reasonably available to counsel may constitute cause
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for a procedural default; nor is there cause on the theory that raising
the claim would have been futile; a § 2255 movant cannot show cause
for failing to make a Bailey v. United States, 516 U. S. 137 (1995), argument on direct appeal by demonstrating that circuit law at the time
would have made any such argument futile; even if cause and prejudice are absent, collateral relief may be granted if the constitutional
error has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent; to establish actually innocence, the movant must demonstrate
that in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no
reasonable juror would have convicted him; actual innocence means
factual innocence and not mere legal insufficiency; “new rule” principle of Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), applies only to procedural
rules and is inapplicable to situation in which this court decides the
meaning of a federal criminal statute; decisions of this court holding
that a substantive federal criminal statute does not reach certain
conduct necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands
convicted for an act that the law does not make criminal; decision of
court of appeals affirming denial of relief is reversed)
14. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U. S. 637 (1998) (in Title I of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Congress
established a “gatekeeping” mechanism for the consideration of second
or successive federal habeas corpus petitions; an individual seeking to
file a second or successive petition must move in the appropriate
federal court of appeals for an order directing the district court to
consider the habeas petition; the court of appeals then has 30 days to
decide whether to grant the authorization to file; a court of appeals
decision whether to grant authorization shall not be appealable and
shall not be the subject of petition for rehearing or for a writ of
certiorari; under the circumstances here, where the § 2254 petitioner,
under a death sentence, claimed that he was insane and therefore could
not be executed, and where claim was raised but not ruled upon when
the district court issued its final order on the habeas petition, there was
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only one habeas petition, not successive ones, and therefore § 2244 was
inapplicable; the petitioner’s claim that because he was insane he could
not be executed, which the district court treated as premature when it
entered its final order, should be treated in the same manner as the
claim of a habeas petitioner who returns to a federal habeas court after
exhausting state remedies; to hold otherwise would mean that a
dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons
would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review;
decision of court of appeals that AEDPA did not apply because there
was no successive petition is affirmed)
15. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U. S. 399 (1998) (as part of
its criminal investigation, Ken Starr’s grand jury subpoenaed Vince
Foster’s attorney to obtain notes the attorney took of an interview with
Foster shortly before Foster’s death; in ruling in favor of Starr and
against the attorney’s effort to quash the subpoena, the Court of
Appeals for the D. C. Circuit became the first common law jurisdiction
court to ever hold that the attorney client privilege does not survive the
death of the client; HELD, “It has generally, if not universally, been
accepted, for well over a century, that the attorney-client privilege
survives the death of the client in a case such as this; ... the Independent Counsel has simply not made a sufficient showing to overturn the
common law rule ... that the attorney client privilege prevents
disclosure of the notes at issue”; decision of court of appeals is
reversed)
16. Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U. S. 113 (1999) (an Iowa police officer
stopped defendant for speeding and issued him a citation rather than
arresting him; nonetheless, the officer conducted a full search of the
automobile, and seized drugs pursuant to the search; the Iowa
Supreme Court has interpreted state statutory law to authorize officers
to conduct a full-blown search in cases where they do not make a
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custodial arrest but instead issue a citation; HELD, the search violated
the fourth amendment; drug convictions reversed)
17. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U. S. 603 (1999) (civil rights action for
damages; “media ride alongs” violate the fourth amendment; here,
while executing an arrest warrant in a private home, police officers
invited representatives of the media to accompany them; the state of
the law was not clearly established when the search in this case took
place, however, and therefore the officers are entitled to the defense of
qualified immunity)
18. Bond v. United States, 529 U. S. 334 (2000) (a law enforcement
officer’s physical manipulation of a bus passenger’s carry-on luggage
violated the fourth amendment’s proscription against unreasonable
searches)
19. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428 (2000) (Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), is a constitutionally based decision; 18 U.
S. C. § 3501, a federal statute enacted in 1968, which purports to make
a confession of guilt inadmissible under Miranda admissible in federal
court is unconstitutional) Note: In his 28 years on the U. S. Supreme
Court, this was Chief Justice Rehnquist’s first and only pro-Miranda
decision.
20. Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004) (alien’s state court conviction
for DUI causing serious bodily injury was not a “crime of violence”
and therefore was not “an aggravated felony” warranting alien’s
deportation)
21. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (the
defendant corporation, which was Enron Corporation’s accounting
firm, was convicted of obstruction of justice because it instructed its
employees, at the time Enron’s financial difficulties were becoming
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public, to destroy documents pursuant to its document retention
policy; the conviction is hereby reversed; we hold that the instructions
given the jury were defective in that they incorrectly defined the term
“corruptly persuad[ing], thereby authorizing a conviction in the
absence of a consciousness of wrongdoing)
PART II
Rehnquist Opinions In Favor of the Government
1. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972) (any violation of defendant’s sixth amendment confrontation rights under Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), was harmless error; conviction affirmed)
2. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (investigatory stops and
frisks incident thereto need not be based on policeman’s personal
observations, but may be based on informer’s tip; order granting
§2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
3. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) (defendant’s sixth amendment confrontation rights were not violated; order granting §2254
habeas corpus relief reversed)
4. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (failure to make pretrial
motion to dismiss raising grand jury claim requires denial of application for postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. §2255 raising the same
claim, absent cause for the failure to file motion; order denying §2255
relief affirmed)
5. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (valid guilty plea requires
denial of application for postconviction habeas corpus relief filed under
28 U.S.C. §2254 raising claim of systematic exclusion of black persons
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from grand jury that indicted defendant; order granting §2254 habeas
corpus relief reversed)
6. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973) (adhering to “subjective” test of entrapment, and rejecting the “objective” test; drug
conviction reinstated)
7.
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (warrantless search of
locked trunk of defendant’s impounded automobile was not violative
of fourth amendment, where defendant, an off-duty policeman, had
been arrested for drunken driving after being involved in accident,
automobile had been towed to private garage, and police had probable
cause to believe the defendant’s service revolver was somewhere in the
automobile; here police were “engage[d] in what, for want of a better
term, may be described as community caretaking functions, totally
divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute;” order granting §2254
habeas corpus relief reversed)
8. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141 (1973) (before a federal court may
overturn a conviction resulting from state criminal trial on grounds
involving a jury instruction claimed to violate due process, it must be
established that the challenged instruction is not merely undesirable,
erroneous, or even universally condemned, but also violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment; furthermore, the instruction must be judged not in isolation but in the context of the overall
charge; order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
9. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (after making a
custodial arrest of defendant for operating a motor vehicle after his
driver’s license had been revoked, police were permitted by the fourth
amendment to conduct a full body search of the defendant; drug
conviction reinstated)
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10. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973) (after making a custodial
arrest of defendant for not having his driver’s license in his possession,
police were permitted by fourth amendment to conduct a full body
search of the defendant; drug conviction affirmed)
11. Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974) (federal statute
relating to search warrants for controlled substances requires no
special showing for a nighttime search other than that the contraband
is likely to be on the property at that time; the standards for issuance
of search warrants for controlled substances in the District of Columbia are governed by the federal statute relating to search warrants for
controlled substances, rather than by local District of Columbia laws
imposing more stringent requirements on nighttime searches; court of
appeals’ judgment reversing pretrial order suppressing the evidence
seized under the search warrant is affirmed)
12. Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974) (under the circumstances, the prosecutor’s improper remarks–consisting of expressing
a personal belief in defendant’s guilt and suggesting defendant,
charged with second degree murder, was guilty of first degree
murder–did not violate the defendant’s fourteenth amendment due
process rights, where defense attorney objected immediately and trial
judge instructed jury to disregard the statement suggesting defendant
was guilty of first degree murder; order granting §2254 habeas corpus
relief reversed)
13. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974) (Miranda warnings are
“not themselves required by the Constitution,” but only “prophylactic
standards” designed to safeguard the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege; order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
14. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (the fourteenth amendment
does not require states to provide free counsel to convicted indigent
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criminal defendants who seek discretionary appeal in state supreme
court, or who seek to file certiorari petition in U.S. Supreme Court;
order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
15. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (articles of Uniform Code of
Military Justice making it criminal for servicemen to engage in “conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” or to engage in “disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline” in the
armed forces, are not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad under the
fifth amendment due process clause; order granting §2241
postconviction habeas corpus relief reversed)
16. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (affirming convictions
for using the mails to carry obscene books)
17. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975) (Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), restricting warrantless automobile
searches not based on probable cause, is not retroactive to searches
conducted before the date of that decision; drug conviction reinstated)
18. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975) (reinstating conviction
for mailing concealable firearm; statute criminalizing such conduct is
not unconstitutionally vague)
19. Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976) (neither the sixth amendment right to counsel clause nor the fifth amendment due process
clause guarantees indigent servicemen defendants the right to appointed counsel in summary court martial proceedings; order granting
§2241 postconviction habeas corpus relief reversed)
20. Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) (a government
informer supplied defendant with heroin, which he was then convicted
of selling to undercover police; since defendant admits he was predisPage 13 of 61

posed to the commit the crime, his claim that he was entrapped fails;
defendant’s due process claim also fails because if the police engage in
illegal activity in concert with a predisposed defendant, the remedy lies
not in freeing the equally culpable defendant, but in prosecuting the
police for crime under the applicable federal or state laws; drug
conviction affirmed) (plurality opinion)
21. United States v. MacCollom, 426 U.S. 317 (1976) (the due process
clause of the fifth amendment does not establish any right to collaterally attack a final judgment of conviction; upholding validity of 28
U.S.C. §753(f), which limits free transcripts for indigent federal
convicts seeking to collaterally attack their conviction to cases where
the trial court certifies that the collateral attack proceeding is not
frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide the proceeding;
dismissal of defendant’s application for §2255 postconviction relief
reinstated) (plurality opinion)
22. United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38 (1976) (warrantless arrest in
public place based on probable cause satisfies the fourth amendment;
the defendant here, who was standing in her doorway when police with
probable cause to arrest her saw and approached her, was in a public
place and hence subject to a lawful arrest; defendant’s act of retreating
into her home at the approach of the police could not thwart an
otherwise proper arrest, and therefore police did not violate fourth
amendment when they followed her into the vestibule of her home and
arrested her there; evidence seized pursuant to the arrest was therefore admissible; drug conviction reinstated)
23. Splawn v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977) (affirming misdemeanor
conviction for selling two reels of obscene film)
24. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (18 U.S.C. §482,
authorizing customs officials to open international mail entering the
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United States if they have reasonable cause to suspect that the mail
contains illegally imported merchandise, does not violate the fourth
amendment; drug conviction reinstated)
25. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 (1977) (defendant’s death sentence
did not violate ex post facto clause, even though there was no valid
death penalty statute on the books at the time of defendant’s crime,
and even though the death penalty statute under which defendant was
sentenced was enacted after defendant’s crime) Note: In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Stevens wrote: “I assume that this case will ultimately
be regarded as nothing more than an archaic gargoyle.”
26. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (partially overruling
“deliberate bypass” test of procedural default set forth in Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963); failure of state prisoner to comply with state
contemporaneous objection rule bars §2254 habeas corpus relief,
absent cause and prejudice; order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief
reversed)
27. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119
(1977) (upholding validity of prison system regulations prohibiting
prisoners from soliciting other inmates to join prisoners’ labor union
and barring union meetings and bulk mailings concerning the union
from outside sources; judgment granting §1983 relief in favor of the
union reversed)
28. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978) (fourth amendment
exclusionary rule should be invoked with much greater reluctance
where the claim is based in a causal relationship between a constitutional violation and the discovery of a live witness than when a similar
claim is advanced to support suppression of an inanimate object; drug
conviction reinstated)
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29. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978) (even though federal
electronic surveillance statute contains a provision that the authorization to intercept be conducted so as to minimize the interception of
communications not otherwise subject to interception, and even though
only 40% of the conversations intercepted were drug-related, failure
of police to make good faith efforts to comply with the minimization
requirement while intercepting communications made on defendant’s
telephone does not require suppression of the evidence; drug conviction affirmed)
30. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978) (United States v. Jenkins,
420 U.S. 358 (1975), overruled; where the defendant seeks to have the
trial terminated without any submission to either judge or jury as to
his guilt or innocence, the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause
does not bar a government appeal from the termination; dismissal of
government’s appeal from the termination reversed)
31. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (partially overruling Jones v.
United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), whereunder anyone legitimately on
the premises had standing to object to an illegal search of the premises;
passengers in automobile have no standing to object to an illegal search
of the automobile, since they asserted neither a property nor a
possessory interest in the automobile, nor in the property (rifles and
ammunition) seized; robbery conviction affirmed)
32. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1978) (defendant, an indigent, was
charged with a shoplifting offense punishable by 1 year in jail, $500.00
fine, or both; he was not provided counsel and after a bench trial was
convicted and fined $50.00; HELD, the sixth amendment right to
counsel does not extend to a case where one is charged with an offense
for which imprisonment upon conviction is authorized but not actually
imposed; conviction affirmed)
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33. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (court declines to acknowledge
propriety of using writ of habeas corpus to attack conditions of pretrial
confinement; neither strip searches, nor “visual body cavity inspections” (whereby “[i]f the inmate is male, he must lift his genitals and
bend over to spread his buttocks for visual inspection,” and whereby
“[t]he vaginal and anal cavities of female inmates are visually inspected”) of pretrial detainees after contact visits with outsiders were
unconstitutional under due process clause; nor were “publisher-only”
rule, the prohibition on receipt of packages, or the room-search rule,
although “[a]dmittedly, this practice [visual body cavity inspections]
instinctively gives us the most pause (!);” in evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial confinement, the proper
inquiry is not whether the conditions are justified by compelling necessities of jail administration, but whether those conditions amount to
punishment; an example of such unconstitutional pretrial punishment
would be “loading a detainee with chains and shackles and throwing
him in a dungeon (!);” “[t]he presumption of innocence ... has no
application to a determination of the rights of a pretrial detainee
during confinement before his trial has even begun (!);” order granting
§2241 habeas corpus relief to federal pretrial detainees housed in
Metropolitan Correctional Center reversed)
34. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979) (Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968), which interpreted sixth amendment confrontation
clause to prohibit admission at joint trial of the confession of a
codefendant who does not take the stand, does not apply where the
defendant himself has confessed and the confessions “interlock;” order
granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed) (plurality opinion),
overruled, Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186 (1987) (Scalia, J.)
35. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394 (1979) (statutory construction
case involving 18 U.S.C. §751(a), which punishes escape from federal
custody; conviction reinstated)
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36. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1979) (when a witness
has been granted immunity and testifies falsely, the fifth amendment
self-incrimination privilege does not prevent the use of his immunized
testimony in a subsequent prosecution for false swearing; conviction
reinstated)
37. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) (defendant, who previously
on two separate occasions had been convicted and sentenced to prison
for felonies (fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain $80.00 worth of
goods or services, and passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36),
was convicted of a third felony (obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses),
and sentenced under the recidivist statute to a mandatory term of life
imprisonment; HELD, the life sentence did not violate the cruel and
unusual punishments clause of the eighth amendment; denial of §2254
habeas corpus relief affirmed)
38. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) (assuming that defendant
and others were illegally detained in a house for 45 minutes while the
police obtained a search warrant for the premises, the detention was
in a “congenial atmosphere (!);” defendant lacked standing to object
to search of his companion’s purse for his illegal drugs; drug conviction affirmed)
39. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980) (“automatic standing”
doctrine of the decision in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960),
is overruled; defendants charged with possessory crimes no longer
have automatic standing to object to the search and seizure of the item
unlawfully possessed; order granting suppression of evidence reversed)
40. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1980) (28 U.S.C. §2254(d), requiring
deference to factual determinations made by state courts, requires
deference to factual determinations of state appellate courts as well as
state trial courts; when granting §2254 habeas corpus relief, the federal
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district court should include in its opinion the reasoning which led it
to conclude that deference to the state court factual determinations was
inappropriate; order granting §2254 relief reversed)
41. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (California’s
statutory rape statute, which punishes males for having sexual intercourse with under-18 females, but does not punish women who have
sexual intercourse with males under 18, does not unlawfully discriminate against males, and is constitutional; conviction affirmed)
(plurality opinion)
42. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1981) (defendant was not denied a
fair trial, even though one juror submitted during the trial an application for employment as an investigator for the district attorney’s office,
and even though the prosecuting attorney withheld the information
about the juror’s job application from the trial court and the
defendant’s attorney until after the trial; order granting §2254 habeas
corpus relief reversed)
43. Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982) (where a defendant in a
criminal trial successfully moves for a mistrial, fifth amendment
double jeopardy clause bars retrial only if the conduct giving rise to
the mistrial was prosecutorial or judicial conduct intended to provoke
the defendant into moving for a mistrial; conviction reinstated)
44. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982) (defendant, an alien, was arrested and charged with smuggling aliens into
this country illegally; three of the passengers in defendant’s car, also
aliens, were also arrested; two of the passengers were then interviewed
by a an assistant United States attorney, who concluded that they did
not possess evidence material to the prosecution or defense of defendant, whereupon the two passengers were deported to Mexico; HELD,
the mere fact that the government deports such witnesses is not
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sufficient to establish a violation of the fifth amendment due process
clause or the sixth amendment confrontation clause, absent a showing
that the evidence lost would be both material and favorable to the defense; the Executive Branch’s responsibility to enforce Congressional
immigration policy justifies deportation of illegal-alien witnesses upon
Executive’s good faith determination that they possess no evidence
favorable to the defendant in a criminal prosecution; conviction
reinstated)
45. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1982) (guilty plea did not
violate due process; order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
46. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (warrantless search of
defendant’s automobile did not violate the fourth amendment; drug
conviction reinstated) (plurality opinion)
47. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (overruling the “two-pronged
test” of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), which required that showing of probable
cause based on informer’s report show both the informer’s basis of
knowledge and the reliability of the informer; the task of the magistrate is simply to determine whether, based on the totality of the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit in support of issuance of a
search warrant, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of crime will be found in a particular place; drug conviction reinstated)
48. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (this case involves use
by narcotics police of a beeper or transponder, i.e., a radio transmitter,
usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals that can be
picked up by a radio receiver, to trace a can of chloroform from its
place of purchase to defendant’s secluded cabin near Shell Lake,
Wisconsin; the governmental surveillance conducted here amounted
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principally to the following of an automobile on public streets and
highways, and “[w]e have commented more than once on the diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile;” “[a] person traveling
in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another;”
“[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from
augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with
such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case
(!);” “[w]e have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline to do so now;” although it is true that because of a
failure of visual surveillance the police were able to locate the chloroform only because of the beeper, the scientific enhancement of this sort
raises no constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also
raise, since a police car could have followed the automobile under
surveillance to the cabin; drug conviction reinstated)
49. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (fourth
amendment is not violated when customs officers, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, board for inspection of documents a vessel that is
located in navigable waters providing ready access to the open sea;
drug conviction reinstated)
50. Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (after being given
Miranda warnings, the defendant requested counsel and the interrogation ceased; a few minutes later, the suspect asked the police what
was going to happen to him now; HELD, the defendant’s question
amounted to an initiation of further conversations with the police, and
therefore the rule of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 777 (1981), does not
bar use of confession the defendant thereafter made in response to
police questioning) (plurality opinion)
51. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (defendant’s death sentence
did not violate U.S. Constitution, even though trial judge, overriding
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jury’s recommendation that defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment, relied on an aggravating circumstance that was not among the
aggravating circumstances established by the state death penalty
statute) (plurality opinion)
52. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984) (“factory surveys” by INS to
enforce immigration laws did not violate the fourth amendment, even
though they were conducted by armed agents displaying badges and
carrying walkie-talkies, some of whom stationed themselves at the exits
of the factory, while others moved systematically through the factory
questioning employees, and arresting, handcuffing, and leading away
persons suspected to be illegal aliens; “our review ... satisfies us that
the encounters with the INS agents were classic consensual encounters
rather than Fourth Amendment seizures (!);” order denying summary
judgment to INS reversed)
53. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475 (1984) (18 U.S.C. §1001,
which makes it a crime to make a false statement in any matter within
the jurisdiction of a federal agency, punishes persons who lie to the FBI
when questioned concerning an on-going criminal investigation; dismissal of indictment reversed)
54. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984) (defendants, inmates
of a federal prison, were suspected of murdering fellow inmates and
placed in administrative segregation; thereafter, as a result of prison
disciplinary proceedings, prison officials concluded that defendants
had committed the murder; although federal prison regulations permit
administrative segregation for up to 90 days for disciplinary reasons,
defendants were kept there for periods ranging from 8 to 19 months,
until their indictments for murder; HELD, defendants’ sixth amendment right to counsel attached only when the indictment was returned,
not when the authorized period of 90 days in administrative segregation expired; convictions reinstated)
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55. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (upholding constitutionality
of New York state statute authorizing pretrial detention of accused
juvenile delinquents; order granting §2241 pretrial habeas corpus
relief reversed)
56. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493 (1984) (as a result of a killing and
theft of property, defendant was indicted on one count each of murder,
involuntary manslaughter, aggravated robbery, and grand theft; at his
arraignment and over the state’s objection, defendant pleaded guilty
to the manslaughter and grand theft charges, and the remaining
charges were dismissed; HELD, the double jeopardy clause does not
bar the state from continuing its prosecution of defendant on the
murder and robbery charges; dismissal of murder and robbery
charges reversed)
57. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (creating “public safety”
exception to holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966);
conviction reinstated)
58. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317 (1984) (no violation of
defendant’s double jeopardy rights; denial of defendant’s motion to
bar retrial affirmed)
59. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984) (federal evidence rules
permit impeachment of witness for bias; conviction reinstated)
60. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (court of appeals
improperly carved out an exception to the decision in Dunn v. United
States, 284 U.S. 290 (1932), which holds that a defendant convicted by
a jury on one count cannot attack the conviction because it was
inconsistent with the verdict of acquittal on another count; drug
conviction reinstated)
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61. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1984) (partially overruling
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), which barred prosecutor
in a capital case from challenging for cause a juror opposed to capital
punishment unless the juror would automatically vote against the
death penalty; the test for determining whether a juror can be challenged for cause because of his or her opposition to capital punishment
is whether the juror’s views would prevent or substantially impair the
performance of his or her duties as a juror; order granting §2254
habeas corpus relief reversed)
62. Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491 (1985) (due process does not require
that prison officials’ reasons for denying an inmate’s witness request
appear in the administrative record of the disciplinary hearing;
although due process does require prison officials at some point to state
their reasons for refusing to call a witness, they may do so by making
the explanation part of the administrative record or by presenting
testimony in court if the prison disciplinary proceeding is later
challenged in court; order granting state habeas corpus relief reversed)
63. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985) (no violation of
defendant’s double jeopardy rights; drug conviction affirmed)
64. United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985)
(defendant, arriving at Los Angeles International Airport on a direct
flight from Columbia, fit the “alimentary canal smuggler profile,” and
was reasonably suspected of being a “balloon swallower,” i.e., a person
who attempts to smuggle drugs into this country hidden in her
alimentary canal; she was taken to a private area and given both a
patdown and a strip search; defendant was not permitted to leave and
was told she would be detained until either she agreed to X-raying or
she defecated into a waste basket so that her excretions could be
examined; defendant’s requests to make a telephone call or to talk to
a lawyer were refused; 16 hours after her flight had landed she was
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still being detained in the customs office without any judicial
authorization, at which time custom officials sought and obtained an
ex parte court order requiring her to submit to X-raying and to a
rectal examination; a physician then conducted the rectal examination
and found balloons of cocaine, at which time defendant was formally
arrested; HELD, customs officials may detain international travelers
entering this country if they have reasonable suspicion that the traveler
is carrying drugs in his or her alimentary canal; although defendant
was held incommunicado 16 hours before a court order was sought, the
detention was not unreasonably long; drug conviction reinstated)
65. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (in order to attack a guilty plea
entered on the advice of counsel claimed to have been ineffective,
defendant must prove both that counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness, and also that there is a reasonable possibility that but for counsel’s error, defendant would not have
pleaded guilty and would have gone to trial; order denying §2254
habeas corpus relief affirmed)
66. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1985) (even assuming that
the simultaneous presence and testimony of two government witnesses
before the grand jury that indicted defendant violated Rule 6(d) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and even though defendant
exercising reasonable diligence did not discover the claimed violation
until the second week of the trial, the trial jury’s guilty verdict
rendered harmless any error occurring in the grand jury proceedings;
we express no opinion as to the appropriate remedy in a case where the
violation of Rule 6(d) is discovered before the commencement of the
trial; the reversal of a conviction entails substantial societal costs, and
in this case the costs are far too substantial to justify overturning the
verdict because of an error in the grand jury proceedings; conviction
reinstated)

Page 25 of 61

67. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (even assuming that
“death-qualifying” trial juries–that is, excusing for cause at the guilt
phase prospective jurors whose opposition to capital punishment
would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties
at the sentencing phase of a capital trial–in fact produces somewhat
more conviction-prone juries than non-death-qualified juries, the use
of death-qualifying procedures does not violate the Federal Constitution; order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
68. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (under the Pennsylvania Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act, visible possession of a
firearm is not an element of the offense charged, but is a “sentencing
consideration” which is proved by a preponderance of the evidence at
sentencing and, if so proved, requires a sentence of at least 5 years
imprisonment for the offense charged (but not greater than the sentence otherwise required for the underlying offense); HELD, this
scheme does not violate due process of law; conviction and sentence
affirmed)
69. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986) (proceedings under the Illinois
Sexually Dangerous Persons Act are not criminal within the meaning
of the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause, and therefore a
person may be committed under the Act on the basis of evidence
obtained in violation of the self-incrimination privilege, even though
proceedings under the Act cannot be brought unless the person has
already been criminally charged and unless in the commitment
proceeding under the Act a sex crime is proved, and even though
proceedings under the Act are accompanied by statutory procedural
safeguards also found in criminal trials (right to counsel, right to trial
by jury, right to confront and cross-examine accusers, and the
requirement that sexual dangerousness be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt), and even though persons committed under the Act are detained
in a maximum security institution which also houses convicts needing
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psychiatric care and which is run by the state department of corrections; judgment committing the defendant under the Act is affirmed)
70. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (coercive police activity
is a necessary predicate to a finding that a confession is involuntary for
due process purposes; the confession of a mentally disturbed person is
voluntary and admissible if there was no police coercion; despite the
“heavy burden” language in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
the state must prove waiver of Miranda rights only by a preponderance of the evidence; conviction reinstated)
71. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1986) (upholding inventory
search of impounded automobile belonging to person arrested for DUI;
drug conviction reinstated)
72. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523 (1986) (Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436 (1966), does not bar admission of oral statements reduced
to writing where after being given Miranda warnings, suspect refused
to make a written statement but agreed to talk about the crime;
conviction reinstated)
73. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538 (1986) (at the sentencing phase
of defendant’s capital trial, the judge instructed the jury that it “must
not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling,” and thereafter defendant
was sentenced to death; HELD, the antisympathy instruction did not
violate the defendant’s federal constitutional rights; death sentence
reinstated)
74. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (there is no federal
constitutional right to appointed counsel in postconviction relief proceedings; states have no obligation to provide postconviction relief
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proceedings as an avenue of relief; order granting state postconviction
relief reversed)
75. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (upholding constitutionality of preventive detention provisions of Bail Reform Act of
1984; due process is not violated because preventive detention of
criminal suspects is “regulatory” rather than “penal;” and “[w]e have
repeatedly held that the government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual’s
liberty interest;” an individual’s right to personal liberty may be
“subordinated to the greater needs of society;” nor does preventive
detention of criminal suspects found to be dangerous to the community
offend the excessive bail clause of the eighth amendment, and any
language to the contrary in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), is “dicta”)
76. Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987) (in deciding whether to
release a §2254 petitioner from custody pending an appeal from a
district court order discharging the petitioner, the court should take
into account the possibility of flight, the risk that the petitioner will
pose a danger to the public if released, and the state’s interest in
continued custody and rehabilitation; order denying stay of §2254
habeas corpus release order pending appeal is vacated)
77. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987) (relaxing restrictions
on admissibility of evidence introduced under the out-of-court
declaration of a co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule; drug
conviction affirmed)
78. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987) (overruling O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), which barred courts martial from
trying servicemen unless the offense was “service connected;” court
martial conviction affirmed)
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79. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1987) (death sentence was not
rendered unconstitutional by inquiries and supplemental charge to the
jury during sentencing deliberations, or by reliance on aggravating
circumstance which duplicated element of capital crime; denial of
§2254 habeas corpus relief is affirmed)
80. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1987) (Griffin v. California,
380 U.S. 609 (1965), which bars prosecutors from commenting on
defendant’s refusal to take the stand, was not violated where the
prosecutor’s reference in closing arguments to defendant’s not testifying was a fair response to claims made by defense counsel in his closing
arguments; conviction reinstated)
81. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988) (upholding
admissibility of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” evidence under Rule
404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence; conviction affirmed)
82. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) (trial court did not err
in declining defendant’s waiver of his right to conflict-free counsel and
in refusing to permit defendant’s proposed substitution of attorneys;
drug conviction affirmed)
83. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (although trial court erred
in not removing for cause a potential juror at voir dire and the defendant was required to use a peremptory challenge to remove the juror,
no violation of defendant’s rights occurred, since the juror did not sit
on the jury; murder conviction and death sentence affirmed)
84. Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988) (custodian of corporate records may not resist a subpoena for the corporate records on the
ground the act of production would incriminate him in violation of the
fifth amendment self-incrimination clause; order refusing to quash
subpoena affirmed)
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85. Lockhart v. Nelson, 488 U.S. 33 (1988) (double jeopardy clause does
not forbid retrial following reversal if the sum of the evidence offered
by the state and admitted–whether erroneously or not–by the court at
the first trial would have been sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict;
order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
86. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (unless a criminal
defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, their failure to
preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due
process of law; conviction reinstated)
87. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1 (1989) (DEA agents had
reasonable suspicion and were therefore lawfully authorized to make
an investigatory stop of defendant (who, Chief Justice Rehnquist notes
several times, was wearing a black jumpsuit and gold jewelry) as he
deplaned at Honolulu International Airport because prior to the stop
the agents knew: (1) defendant had paid $2100 for 2 airplane tickets
from a roll of twenty dollar bills; (2) defendant traveled under a name
that did not match the name under which his telephone was listed; (3)
defendant’s original destination was Miami, a source city for illegal
drugs; (4) defendant stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though
the roundtrip flight from Honolulu to Miami takes 20 hours; (5) defendant appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) defendant checked
none of his luggage; drug conviction reinstated)
88. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U. S. 794 (1989) (no due process presumption of vindictiveness in sentencing arose where defendant
pleaded guilty and was sentenced, the guilty plea was later vacated,
and defendant was then tried for and convicted of the same offense and
sentenced to a longer term of imprisonment than he had received
following the guilty plea; Simpson v. Rice, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
overruled; conviction reinstated)
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89. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U. S. 1 (1989) (state collateral proceedings are not constitutionally required, and states have no obligation to
provide this avenue of relief; U.S. Constitution does not guarantee
appointed counsel to indigents sentenced to death who seek state
postconviction relief) (plurality opinion)
90. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U. S. 195 (1989) (Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), was not violated where police gave the required
warnings to suspect but added this sentence: “We have no way of giving
you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you if you wish if and when
you go to court (!);” order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief
reversed)
91. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U. S. 259 (1990) (alien
defendant, whose Mexican residences were searched by DEA agents,
lacks sufficient voluntary connections to the United States to be
entitled to the protections of the fourth amendment; the use of the term
“people” in the fourth amendment means that its protections, unlike
those of the fifth and sixth amendments, extend only “to a class of
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part
of that community;” court is only willing to assume that the
protections of the fourth amendment apply to illegal aliens in this
country; the fourth amendment’s “purpose was to restrict searches
and seizures which might be conducted by the United States in domestic matters;” “[w]ere defendant to prevail, aliens with no attachment
to this country might well bring actions for damages to remedy claimed
violations of the Fourth Amendment in foreign countries or in international waters (!);” drug conviction reinstated)
92. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U. S. 299 (1990) (upholding
constitutionality of Pennsylvania death penalty statute; conviction and
sentence affirmed)
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93. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U. S. 344 (1990) (statement extracted
from a defendant by the police in violation of the sixth amendment
right to counsel and inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt may
nonetheless be used as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the
defendant’s credibility if the defendant takes the stand; conviction
reinstated)
94. Boyde v. California, 494 U. S. 370 (1990) (jury instruction that the
jury shall impose a death sentence if aggravating circumstances
outweigh mitigating circumstances does not violate eighth amendment;
claim that another instruction to jury restricted impermissibly jury’s
consideration of mitigating circumstances is rejected because there is
no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the challenged
instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of
constitutionally relevant evidence; conviction and sentence affirmed)
95. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U. S. 407 (1990) (Arizona v. Roberson,
486 U.S. 675 (1988), which bars police from interrogating a suspect
about other crimes once the suspect has received the Miranda
warnings and invoked the right to counsel, was not dictated by prior
precedent and therefore is not retroactively applicable to cases on
collateral review at time of Roberson decision; order denying §2254
habeas corpus relief is affirmed)
96. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U. S. 444 (1990)
(upholding the validity, under the fourth amendment, of police drunk
driver roadblocks–called by the Court “highway sobriety checkpoints”–conducted by stopping every car passing through the
checkpoint and questioning the driver, all without a warrant, without
probable cause, without reasonable suspicion, and without any
indication of criminal activity)
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97. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37 (1990) (state statute permitting reformation of improper verdicts assessing unauthorized punishments, without the necessity of granting a new trial, did not, as applied
to petitioner whose offense was committed prior to enactment of the
statute, violate ex post facto clause; order granting §2254 habeas
corpus relief reversed)
98. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991) (admission of a
defendant’s involuntary confession at a criminal trial may be harmless
error (!))
99. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U. S. 248 (1991) (general consent by
suspect to search of car for drugs includes consent to search any closed
container in the car that might have the drugs inside; order granting
suppression of evidence reversed)
100. Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U. S. 415 (1991) (although defendant’s
capital murder trial was preceded by exceptionally prejudicial
publicity and 8 of the 12 jurors who ultimately sat on the jury admitted
exposure to this publicity, there was no due process violation when
trial judge merely asked the potential jurors who admitted to hearing
about the case whether they could be impartial but refused ask them
questions about the source or content of their knowledge of the case;
conviction and death sentence affirmed)
101. Chapman v. United States, 500 U. S. 453 (1991) (statute requiring
minimum 5-year sentence for distributing more than one gram of a
mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of LSD requires
that weight of carrier medium–in this case, blotter paper–be included,
even though here the pure LSD weighed only 50 milligrams and the
total weight of the paper and the LSD was 5.7 grams; drug conviction
affirmed)
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102. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U. S. 496 (1987), and Gathers v. South Carolina, 490 U.
S. 805 (1990), and holding eighth amendment cruel and unusual
punishments clause does not bar admission of victim impact evidence
during the penalty phase of a capital punishment trial; conviction and
death sentence affirmed)
103. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U. S. 62 (1991) (order granting §2254
habeas corpus relief reversed; the alleged errors, admission of battered
child syndrome evidence, and the instructions given the jury, did not
amount to due process violations)
104. White v. Illinois, 502 U. S. 301 (1992) (confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment does not require that, before a trial court admits
evidence under the “spontaneous declaration” and “medical examination” exceptions to the hearsay rule, the prosecution must either
produce the declarant at trial or the trial court must find that the
declarant is unavailable)
105. United States v. Felix, 503 U. S. 378 (1992) (a prosecution of a
defendant for conspiracy, where certain of the overt acts relied upon
by the government are based on substantive offenses for which the
defendant has been previously convicted, does not violate double
jeopardy clause of fifth amendment; decisions of court of appeals
reversing defendant’s drug offense conviction reversed)
106. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U. S. 655 (1992) (instead
of adhering to an extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico, DEA officials hired gangsters to forcibly kidnap the defendant,
a Mexican doctor, from his offices in Guadalajara, Mexico and bring
him to the United States; the lower federal courts held that, because
the abduction violated the extradition treaty, the defendant was entitled to be returned to Mexico prior to trial; HELD, judgment reversed:
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the illegal actions of the DEA did not violate the extradition treaty and
the federal courts do not lack jurisdiction to try the defendant; since
the treaty says nothing about illegal kidnappings outside the treaty,
such abductions are not in violation of the treaty (!); the treaty does
not forbid all means of gaining the presence of an individual outside its
terms (!); “[defendant] and his amici may be correct that [defendant’s]
abduction was shocking . . . and that it may be in violation of general
international law principles” (!))
107. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U. S. 333 (1992) (the “actual innocence”
exception to the rule that federal claims procedurally defaulted in the
state court system may not be raised in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding is narrow in scope; in the context of an attack on a death
sentence rather than a conviction, the narrow exception for “actual
innocence” is applicable only if the convicted person shows, by clear
and convincing evidence, that, but for the constitutional error that
occurred at sentencing, no reasonable juror would have voted for the
death penalty; denial of §2254 habeas corpus relief affirmed)
108. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U. S. 364 (1993) (failure of defense
counsel to make an objection in a state criminal proceeding–an objection that would have been supported by a decision which was subsequently overruled–did not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel;
order granting §2254 habeas corpus relief reversed)
109. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390 (1993) (newly discovered
evidence of innocence, even in a capital punishment case, is not
grounds for §2254 habeas corpus relief (!); denial of §2254 relief
affirmed)
110. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U. S. 619 (1993) (in §2254 habeas
corpus proceedings, the applicable harmless error standard is not the
standard used on direct appeal, whereunder a constitutional error
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cannot be deemed unless the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error was harmless; instead, the harmless error standard
applicable to §2254 proceedings is a less onerous one, namely, the
harmless error standard traditionally limited in federal court to
nonconstitutional errors, i.e., whether the error had a substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict; denial
of §2254 relief affirmed)
111. Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U. S. 333 (1993) (under the holding in
Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989), the lower court decision granting
§2254 habeas corpus relief was erroneous because it amounted to a
"new rule" in criminal procedure and therefore cannot form the basis
for granting postconviction habeas corpus relief; order granting §2254
relief reversed)
112. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U. S. 476 (1993) (state statute permitting enhancement of sentence when defendant intentionally selects his
victim on basis of race is constitutional; state court decision vacating
sentence reversed)
113. Alexander v. United States, 509 U. S. 544 (1993) (defendant, who
owned more than a dozen bookstores and theaters dealing in sexually
explicit materials, was convicted on numerous counts of violating
federal obscenity and racketeering laws for having sold four magazines
and three videotapes; following his convictions, defendant was sentenced to six years in prison, fined $100,000, and ordered to pay the
costs of his prosecution, incarceration, and supervised release; as
additional punishment for the crimes for which he was convicted,
defendant had his entire wholesale and retail business forfeited, including the assets of that business and almost nine million dollars acquired
through that business; HELD, the forfeiture did not violate the first
amendment (!); however, the judgment of the federal court of appeals
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is reversed so that court may pass upon defendant’s claim that the
forfeiture violated the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment)
114. Weiss v. United States, 510 U. S. 163 (1994) (special court martial
convictions affirmed; current method of appointing military judges is
constitutional, and the lack of a fixed term of office for military judges
does not violate due process)
115. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U. S. 266 (1994) (arrest without probable
cause does not violate substantive due process, although it may violate
fourth amendment; dismissal of arrestee’s §1983 civil rights action
affirmed) (plurality opinion)
116. Custis v. United States, 511 U. S. 485 (1994) (except for
convictions obtained in violation of right to counsel, defendant in
federal sentencing proceeding has no right, during the sentencing
proceeding, to collaterally attack the validity of previous state convictions used to enhance his federal sentence (!); sentence affirmed)
117. Nichols v. United States, 511 U. S. 738 (1994) (a sentencing court
may consider a defendant’s previous uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction in sentencing him for a subsequent offense as long as the
previous uncounseled conviction did not result in a sentence of imprisonment; sentence affirmed)
118. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U. S. 1 (1994) (no violation of due
process or of the eighth amendment occurred when at the sentencing
phase of defendant’s capital punishment trial the prosecution was
allowed to introduce evidence that defendant previously had been
sentenced to death in another case (!)) Note: The previous death
sentence was reversed on direct appeal while the defendant’s present
death sentence was being appealed (!). Also, during the defendant’s
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present appeal the defendant was retried, reconvicted, and again
sentenced to death on the previous capital charges.
119. United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U. S. 64 (1994)
(provision of federal statute criminalizing child pornography should be
construed to require that defendant know that one of the sexual
performers is a minor, and, so construed, the provision is not facially
unconstitutional; court of appeals decision reversing defendant’s
conviction under the provision is reversed)
120. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1 (1995) (evidence obtained by an
arrest that violates the fourth amendment is admissible (!), where the
officer who made the arrest acted in reliance on computer information
erroneously indicating the existence of an outstanding arrest warrant
for the defendant–the warrant in fact had been quashed by a judge 17
days earlier–and a court clerk, rather than the police, was responsible
for the erroneous entry in the police computer; there is, therefore, a
“categorical exception to the exclusionary rule for clerical errors of
court employees”)
121. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U. S. 472 (1995) (action of state officials
in placing inmate in segregated confinement for 30 days as a
disciplinary measure did not violate inmate’s due process rights;
decision of court of appeals in favor of inmate reversed)
122. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U. S. 593 (1995) (court of appeals
erred in reversing defendant’s conviction for disclosing wiretap
information, and its decision reversed)
123. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U. S. 442 (1996) (petitioner, a joint owner
with her husband of an automobile–which was 11 years old and cost
$600.00–in which the husband engaged in sexual activity with a prostitute, with the result that a state court ordered the automobile forfeited
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as a public nuisance, with no offset for her interest, notwithstanding
her lack of knowledge of her husband’s activity; HELD, there is no
constitutional requirement that an innocent owner defense be
provided, and the forfeiture did not violate due process clause of
amendment or the takings clause of the fifth amendment; judgment
affirmed)
124. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U. S. 456 (1996) (respondents,
black persons charged with crack cocaine offenses, moved for
discovery in the federal district on grounds blacks were singled out for
prosecution on account of their race; when the discovery motion was
granted, the government refused to comply, with the result that the
case was dismissed, and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal;
HELD, because the respondents failed to make a threshold showing
that the government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of
other races, the dismissal order is reversed)
125. Gray v. Netherland, 518 U. S. 152 (1996) (affirming denial of
federal habeas corpus relief to state convict sentenced to death)
126. United States v. Ursery, 518 U. S. 267 (1996) (double jeopardy
clause does not prohibit the government from both punishing a
defendant for a criminal offense and forfeiting his property for that
same offense; courts of appeals judgments to the contrary are reversed)
127. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651 (1996) (provisions of Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 restricting successive
federal habeas corpus petitions are constitutional; denial of habeas
corpus relief to death row inmate affirmed)
128. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U. S. 33 (1996) (fourth amendment does
not require that a lawfully seized motorist be advised that he is free to
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go before his consent to search his automobile will be recognized as
valid (!))
129. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U. S. 408 (1997) (a police officer, without
violating the fourth amendment, may as a matter of course order not
only the driver but also the passengers of a lawfully stopped
automobile to exit the vehicle; decision granting motion to suppress is
reversed)
130. Johnson v. United States, 520 U. S. 461 (1997) (under the plain
error doctrine, an appellate court may correct an error occurring in
the convicting court even though the error was not raised in the
convicting court; in order for the plain error doctrine to apply, there
must be (1) error, (2) the error must be plain, (3) the error must affect
substantial rights, and (4) the error must seriously affect the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; here the error
did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings; conviction affirmed)
131. United States v. Hyde, 520 U. S. 670 (1997) (where district court
accepted guilty plea but deferred acceptance of plea agreement,
defendant could not withdraw plea pursuant to Rule 32(e), Fed. R.
Crim. Proc., without showing a fair and just reason; court of appeals
judgment to the contrary is reversed)
132. Hudson v. United States, 522 U. S. 93 (1997) (overruling United
States v. Halper, 490 U. S. 435 (1989); where the government
administratively imposed penalties and occupation debarment on
defendants and then later indicted for the same conduct, the double
jeopardy clause is not a bar to the later criminal prosecution; decision
of court of appeals denying pretrial double jeopardy claim is affirmed)
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133. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U. S. 269 (1998) (§ 2254 habeas
corpus case by death row inmate; the eighth amendment does not
require that a capital jury be instructed on the concept of mitigating
evidence generally, or on particular statutory factors; decision of court
of appeals denying relief is affirmed)
134. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U. S. 65 (1998) (we have previously
held that “no-knock” entries are justified when police officers have a
reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence
before entering would be dangerous or futile or inhibit their effective
investigation of the crime; however, the fourth amendment does not
hold officers to a higher standard when a “no-knock” entry results in
the destruction of property; under the circumstances here, the police
“no-knock” entry did not violate the fourth amendment; court of
appeals decision affirming order suppressing evidence is reversed)
135. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U. S. 83 (1999) (defendants and the
lessee of an apartment were sitting in on of the rooms, bagging cocaine;
who so engaged they ere observed by a police officer who looked
through a drawn window blind; HELD, no violation of defendants’s
fourth amendment rights occurred; in order to claim the protection of
the fourth amendment, a defendant must demonstrate that he
personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that
his expectation is reasonable; the defendants were not overnight guests
or in anything similar to an overnight guest relationship; there is no
suggestion that defendants had a previous relationship with the lessee
of the apartment, or that there was any other purpose for the visit;
defendants were using the property for commercial purposes, and they
spent a relatively short amount of time on the premises; therefore,
defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment;
we need not decide whether the police officer’s observation constituted
a search for purposes of the fourth amendment; judgment of the
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Minnesota Supreme Court reversing the convictions is reversed;
convictions reinstated)
136. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U. S. 286 (1999) (§ 1983 civil rights action
for damages; no violation of the fourteenth amendment occurred when
prosecutor directed police detective to secure a search warrant and
then caused the search warrant to search the person of attorney to be
served on that attorney at the same time the attorney’s client was
testifying before a grand jury; the fourteenth amendment right to
practice one’s calling is not violated by the execution of a search
warrant, whether calculated to annoy or even to prevent consultation
with a grand jury witness; decision of court of appeals denying
qualified immunity to the prosecutor and others is reversed)
137. Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1 (1999) (the harmless error rule
applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of the offense;
conviction affirmed)
138. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U. S. 119 (2000) (defendant fled upon
seeing police officers patrolling an area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking; HELD, the arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop of defendant pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392
U. S. 1 (1968); state supreme court decision reversing defendant’s
conviction for illegal possession of a pistol on grounds of illegal search
and seizure is reversed, and the conviction is reinstated)
139. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U. S. 225 (2000) (at the sentencing phase
of defendant’s death penalty trial, the trial judge did not err in
responding to a question from the deliberating jurors by directing
them to reread a paragraph of the written instructions he had given
them; court of appeals decision denying habeas corpus relief to
defendant sentenced to death is affirmed)
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140. Ohler v. United States, 529 U. S. 753 (2000) (prior to defendant’s
trial on drug charges the prosecution filed a motion in limine to
introduce evidence of her prior felony drug conviction, which was
granted; after the motion was granted, the defendant, to remove the
sting of having the prosecution bring out the prior conviction on crossexamination, admitted the prior conviction on direct examination;
HELD, a defendant who preemptively introduces evidence of a prior
conviction on direct examination may not on appeal claim that the
admission of such evidence was error; conviction affirmed)

141. Texas v. Cobb, 532 U. S. 162 (2001) (the sixth amendment right
to counsel is “offense specific;” with respect to the right to exclude
statements obtained in violation of the sixth amendment right to
counsel, the sixth amendment right attaches only to the offense the
defendant is formally charged with, and does not attach to offenses
“closely related factually” to the charged offense; there is no difference
between “offense” in the double jeopardy and the right to counsel
contexts, and therefore when the sixth amendment right to counsel
attaches, it encompasses not only the offense charged but also offenses
that if charged would be considered the same offense in the double
jeopardy context; at the time he confessed, the defendant had been
indicted for burglary but not formally charged with murder; under
Texas law, these crimes are not the same offense in the double jeopardy
context; therefore, the confession was not obtained in violation of the
right to counsel; state appellate court decision reversing murder
conviction is reversed, and murder conviction and death sentence are
reinstated)
142. United States v. Knights, 534 U. S. 112 (2001) (defendant was
convicted of a drug offense in state court and sentenced to probation;
one condition of probation was that defendant would submit his
person, property, place of residence, vehicle, and personal effects to
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search at anytime, without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer;
police officers, aware of the search condition in defendant’s probation
order and possessed of reasonable suspicion that he had recently
committed arson and related crimes against a power company
transformer, searched defendant’s house where they found a
detonation cord, ammunition, liquid chemicals, instruction manuals on
chemistry and electrical circuitry, bolt cutters, telephone pole-climbing
spurs, etc.; the defendant was then indicted in federal court on charges
of conspiracy to commit arson, possession of unregistered destructive
devices, and being a felon in possession of ammunition; the defendant
then filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from his home;
HELD, the search of defendant’s home did not violate the fourth
amendment; when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a
probationer subject to a probation condition is engaged in criminal
activity, the search is reasonable; a warrantless search supported by
reasonable suspicion and authorized by a condition of probation does
not violate the fourth amendment; court of appeals decision affirming
order suppressing evidence is reversed)
143. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U. S. 266 (2002) (fourth amendment
protections extend to brief investigative stops of persons or vehicles
that fall short of traditional arrest; an investigative stop need not be
supported by probable cause to believe a crime has been committed,
but only by reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; in
making reasonable-suspicion determinations, courts must look at the
totality of the circumstances; this allows officers to draw on their own
experience and specialized training to make inferences and deductions
about the cumulative information available to them that might well
elude an untrained person; although an officer’s “hunch” is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise
to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short
of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard; a
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determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not rule out the
possibility of innocent conduct; here, there was reasonable suspicion
for border patrol agent’s stopping of the defendant’s minivan while he
was driving on an unpaved road commonly used by smugglers in a
remote area of southeastern Arizona; the circumstances the agent
deemed suspicious included: it appeared the minivan might be trying
to circumvent a border patrol checkpoint; the minivan was driving at
a time when agents begin heading back to the checkpoint for a shift
change, which leaves the area unpatrolled (smugglers are most active
when agents are en route back to the checkpoint); the defendant’s
vehicle was a minivan, a type of automobile smugglers use; the driver
of the minivan slowed dramatically on seeing the agent’s car; the
driver appeared stiff and his posture very rigid and he did not look at
the agent and seemed to pretend the agent was not there; the three
children in the back of the minivan began to wave in an abnormal
pattern as if they were being instructed, and their odd waving
continued on and off for about five minutes; the knees of the two
children sitting in the very back seat were unusually high, as if their
feet were propped up on some cargo on the floor; the minivan made
an abrupt turn, onto a rougher road usually traversed by four-wheel
drive vehicles, at the last place that would have allowed it to avoid the
checkpoint; the minivan was not part of the local traffic; and a radio
registration check of the minivan showed it was registered to an
address in Douglas, Arizona that was four blocks north of the border
in an area notorious for alien and narcotics smuggling; court of
appeals decision reversing denial of motion to suppress the 128 pounds
of marijuana seized from the minivan by the agent is reversed)
144. United States v. Cotton, 535 U. S. 625 (2002) (Ex parte Bain, 121
U. S. 1 (1887), which held that an improper amendment of an
indictment deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the offense and
therefore authorized federal habeas corpus relief from a conviction
based on the amended indictment, is overruled to the extent it held that
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a defective indictment deprives a court of jurisdiction; Bain is a
product of an era when this Court’s authority of review federal
criminal convictions was greatly circumscribed and when habeas
corpus relief was limited to jurisdictional errors; in the Bain era this
Court’s desire to correct obvious constitutional violations led to a
somewhat expansive notion of jurisdiction, which was more a fiction
than anything else; Bain’s elastic concept of jurisdiction is not what the
term “jurisdiction” means today, i.e., the court’s statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the case; under the modern concept
of subject matter jurisdiction, defects in subject matter jurisdiction can
never be waived or forfeited, and defects in subject-matter jurisdiction
require correction regardless of whether the error was raised in
district court; in contrast, the right to grand jury indictment may be
waived; post-Bain cases confirm that defects in an indictment do not
deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case; here, the defect in the
indictment–that it failed to allege a fact, drug quantity, that increased
the statutory maximum sentence–was not jurisdictional, and since the
defendant did not raise the claim of error in the district court, the
error is reviewable only under the plain error; here, the defective
indictment was not plain error because it did not seriously affect the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings; court
of appeals decision vacating the sentence is reversed)
145. Bell v. Cone, 535 U. S. 685 (2002) (on grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel at penalty phase of his capital murder trial, the
court of appeals granted state death row inmate federal habeas corpus
relief from his death sentence and ordered him resentenced; at his trial
the inmate’s defense counsel was a lawyer named Dice who subsequent
to inmate’s trial was diagnosed with a mental illness that disqualified
him to practice law and apparently led to his suicide; Dice’s
shortcomings at the penalty phase included a failure to interview
witnesses who could have provided mitigating evidence, a failure to
introduce available mitigating evidence, and a failure to make any
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closing argument or plea for his client’s life at the conclusion of the
penalty phase; in his opening statement at the beginning of the guilt
phase of the trial, Dice promised several witnesses in aid of his client’s
insanity defense, including the defendant’s mother, sister, and two
aunts, but then presented only three witnesses in support of the
insanity defense–the mother, a clinical psychologist and a
pharmacologist; Dice also promised to prove that the murder victim’s
sister had written a letter of forgiveness to the defendant, but it was
never submitted to the jury; in its rebuttal case at the guilt phase, the
state introduced the testimony of a witness who, as Dice later
acknowledged, virtually destroyed the defendant’s insanity defense
(“We were totally unprepared for that”); Dice had known that the
witness was a possible prosecution witness but failed to interview her
prior to the trial; Dice did four things at the penalty phase: he made a
brief opening argument asking for mercy, he referenced the insanity
evidence presented at the guilt phase, he brought out on crossexamination that the defendant had been awarded the Bronze Star in
while serving in Vietnam, and he successfully objected to the state’s
introduction of two photographs of the murder victims; he did not,
however, interview witnesses aside from those relevant to guilt phase,
he did not present testimony relevant to mitigation from available
witnesses; he did not present testimony relevant to mitigation from
witnesses who were available; and he made no plea for his client’s life
or closing remarks after the state’s case; HELD, the court of appeals
decision granting § 2254 relief is reversed; the 1996 Antiterrorism
statute modified a federal habeas court’s role to ensure state
convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law; federal
habeas court can grant § 2254 habeas relief only if the state court
decision is contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law, as determined by the U. S. Supreme
Court; under the “contrary to” clause, habeas relief may be granted if
the state court applies a rule different from the governing rule set forth
in our cases, or if it decides a case differently than we have done on a
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set of materially indistinguishable facts; under the “unreasonable
application” clause, habeas relief may be granted if the state court
correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but
unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case; under the
“unreasonable application” clause, habeas relief may not be granted
simply because the federal court in its independent judgment concludes
that the state court decision applied clearly established federal law
erroneously or incorrectly; rather, under the “unreasonable
application” clause, the habeas petitioner must show that the state
court applied the governing legal principle to the facts of his case in an
objectively unreasonable manner; here, the state court decision that
the defendant received effective assistance of counsel at the penalty
phase was not contrary to, and did not involve an unreasonable
application of, clearly established federal law)
146. Price v. Vincent, 538 U. S. 634 (2003) (decision of court of appeals
granting federal habeas corpus relief to state prison inmate is reversed;
federal habeas relief can be granted if the state court decision is
contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the U. S.
Supreme Court; a state court decision is contrary to clearly established
federal law as determined by the U. S. Supreme Court if it applies a
rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in U. S. Supreme
Court cases or if it confronts a set of facts materially indistinguishable
from a decision of the U. S. Supreme Court and reaches a result
different from the Supreme Court precedent; here, the decision of the
state court on the double jeopardy issue was not an objectively
unreasonable application of U. S. Supreme Court caselaw)
147. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U. S. 366 (2003) (in the early morning
hours a passenger car occupied by three men was stopped for speeding
by a police officer; the officer, upon searching the car, seized $763 of
rolled-up cash from the glove compartment and five glassine baggies
of cocaine from between the back-seat armrest and the back seat; after
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all three men denied ownership of the cocaine and money, the officer
arrested each of them; we hold that the officer had probable cause to
arrest Pringle, a front-seat passenger, and one of the three men in the
car; in fact, the officer had probable cause to arrest any and all of the
three men; decision of Maryland Court of Appeals reversing
defendant’s conviction is reversed)
148. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U. S. 149 (2004) (customs
officials seized 37 kilograms–a little more than 81 pounds–of
marijuana from respondent’s gas tank at the international border; the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the Fourth
Amendment forbade the fuel tank search absent reasonable suspicion;
the respondent was attempting to enter the U. S. from across the
Mexican border; a customs inspector conducted an inspection of the
station wagon, and requested respondent to leave the vehicle; the
vehicle was then taken to a secondary inspection station; a second
customs inspector inspected the gas tank by tapping it, and noted that
the tank sounded solid; subsequently, the inspector requested a
mechanic under contract with Customs to come to the border station
to remove the tank; within 20 to 30 minutes, the mechanic arrived; he
raised the car on a hydraulic lift, loosened the straps and unscrewed
the bolts holding the gas tank to the undercarriage of the vehicle, and
then disconnected some hoses and electrical connections; after the gas
tank was removed, the inspector hammered off bondo (a putty-like
hardening substance that is used to seal openings) from the top of the
gas tank; the inspector opened an access plate underneath the bondo
and found 37 kilograms of marijuana bricks; the process took 15 to 25
minutes; we hold that the search in question did not require reasonable
suspicion; the government’s interest in preventing the entry of
unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international
border; time and again, we have stated that searches made at the
border, pursuant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect
itself by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into
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this country, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur
at the border; we conclude that the government’s authority to conduct
suspicionless inspections at the border includes the authority to
remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank; decision of
court of appeals affirming the district court’s order granting the
motion to suppress the marijuana is reversed)
149. Thornton v. United States, 541 U. S. 615 (2004) (once a police
officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of an automobiles’s occupant,
the Fourth Amendment allows the officer to search the vehicle’s
passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest, even
when an officer does not make contact until the person arrested has
already left the vehicle; the stress of arrest is no less merely because the
arrestee exited his car before the officer initiated contact, nor is an
arrestee less likely to attempt to lunge for a weapon or to destroy
evidence if he is outside of, but still in control of, the vehicle; in all
relevant aspects, the arrest of a suspect who is next to a vehicle
presents identical concerns regarding officer safety and evidence
destruction as one who is inside; decision of court of appeals affirming
petitioner’s conviction is affirmed)
150. Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125 (2004) (criminal defense
attorneys lacked standing to seek federal injunctive relief against
Michigan state judges who, in violation of lower federal court ruling,
declined to appoint counsel to represent guilty-pleading defendants
who sought a direct appeal)
151. Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93 (2004) (at 7 a.m., armed with a
search warrant issued in connection with an investigation of a gangrelated drive-by shooting, 8 police SWAT team officers clad in helmets
and black vests broke into the house where a young lady, 5-foot 2-inch
Iris Mena, the only resident in the house, was sleeping, entered her
bedroom, handcuffed her hands behind her back at gunpoint,
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searched her, forced her, still in her bed clothes, to walk barefoot
through pouring rain to a nearby garage, and then kept her there for
3 hours while the house was searched, and denying her repeated
requests to remove the handcuffs; we hold that Mena’s detention was
reasonable and did not violate the Fourth Amendment)
152. Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (state prisoner’s federal
habeas corpus petition was untimely under the federal habeas corpus
statute’s 1 year statute of limitations; furthermore, the prisoner was
not entitled to equitable tolling of the limitation period; denial of the
habeas petition is affirmed)
END OF INIMICUS LIBERTATIS
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